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Abstract
This paper analyzes the restructuring of private, occupational pensions in the Netherlands,
Denmark and Switzerland. Despite the institutional similarities of all three systems
(extensive pre-funding, collectively organized pensions, near-universal coverage), the
three systems differ in important ways in terms of governance. The paper investigates the
ways in which these variable governance structures shaped responses to the stock market
downturn in 2001-2002. The Dutch occupational pension system experienced substantial
retrenchment (shift from career earnings to average earnings formulae in defined benefit
(DB) schemes as well as increased contributions) whereas the Danish and Swiss schemes
sustained fewer cutbacks. The paper argues that the DB structure of Dutch pensions as well
as the specifics of the regulatory framework forced a drastic adaptation to changes in
financial markets, whereas the flexible defined contribution (DC) framework in Denmark
and Switzerland facilitated a more modest adaptation to the market downturn.
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Introduction
Retrenchment in second pillar pensions poses a puzzle for the welfare state literature. With
few exceptions (for example, Bridgen and Meyer 2006) the retrenchment literature has
focused on publicly organized social policies. Private and occupational social policies
usually enter the analysis only to the extent that they offer compensation opportunities for
politicians seeking to reduce the electoral risks associated with scaling back public
commitments (Pierson 1994). An emerging literature questions this focus on retrenchment
in public social policies, asking how different public-private mixes, especially the
interplay between public and occupational welfare, shape retrenchment dynamics in
privately organized occupational welfare (Myles and Pierson 2001; Trampusch 2006;
Hacker 2002).
Multipillar pension systems are often touted as the answer to the financing problems
facing many OECD countries’ public pension systems (see World Bank 1994). The Swiss
system has been celebrated as the “triumph of common sense,” (Quiesser and Vittas 2000)
and in 2007 the Dutch and Danish systems were recently ranked among Europe’s “best
pension systems” by an influential consultancy (Aon). These countries share an approach
to retirement provision that combines a public, universal basic pension scheme that is
highly effective in preventing old-age poverty (the first pillar), an extensive, quasi-
mandatory system of pre-funded, earnings-related occupational pensions (the second
pillar) and considerable private pension coverage (the third pillar). Advocates argue that
the multipillar approach has several advantages over a system dominated by public
provision: risks are spread across the pillars, and pre-funding creates a large pool of
investment capital (World Bank 1994). What is less well-known, and certainly less
emphasized in public debates about the future direction of pension policy in Europe, is that
multipillar systems are not immune to economic and demographic challenges. Much like
the public, pay-as-you-go (current revenues finance current benefits) pension schemes that
are being radically restructured to cope with unfavorable dependency ratios and a climate
of “permanent austerity,” second pillar pensions in Switzerland, Denmark, and the
Netherlands have been radically restructured since 2000, largely because of erratic
financial market performance since 2000.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on “private” social policy and the
politics of regulation by analyzing the politics associated with the retrenchment of
occupational pensions. The multi-pillar pension systems in the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Switzerland are especially good cases for investigating the dynamics of retrenchment and
restructuring in private social insurance policies. All three countries boast highly
developed first and second pillar pension schemes; the size of the first and second pillars
(measured in terms of scope and maturity) in all three countries is roughly similar, as is
the degree of compulsion in the second pillar.1 This means that these two key parameters
of the “public-private mix” are held constant, and the regulatory framework and benefit
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design of occupational pension arrangements are allowed to vary across the three
countries. This permits an analysis of the ways in which the institutional structure of
occupational pensions shapes the responses of occupational pension providers to financial
market turbulence, especially the distribution of gains and losses from market performance.
Drawing on the work of Hacker (2002) this paper argues that the structure of
occupational pension regulation and provision creates a politics of regulation that is in
many ways different from the distributional politics surrounding public pensions. The
regulation and decision-making concerning private, occupational pensions is a low-
visibility process involving actors and interests that differ substantially from those
involved in public pension politics. Moreover, institutional change processes in private
occupational pensions are governed by a market logic rather than a political logic
(Anderson 2002; Hacker 2002). Whereas elected politicians make decisions concerning
the downward adjustment of public pensions to unfavorable economic developments, the
boards of pension schemes make these decisions in many, if not, most European
occupational schemes. This means that the groups negatively affected by occupational
pension restructuring cannot blame elected politicians for their losses. Instead, responsibility
for losses is shared among many decentralized actors associated with the pension schemes
themselves, and pension losses can be blamed on the anonymous workings of the market
rather than politically accountable actors.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the political science
literature concerning the regulation of private occupational welfare. The second section
offers a detailed analysis of the restructuring of occupational pensions in the Netherlands
in the 2000s. The third section briefly discusses similar processes in Denmark and
Switzerland. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the lessons of the Dutch,
Danish and Swiss experiences in terms of second pillar pension regulation and the
literature on “private social policy.”2
The Politics of Private Social Insurance
The distinction between public and private welfare is not new. Indeed, Richard Titmuss
(1958) included occupational welfare in his influential typology of welfare provision.
Papadakis and Taylor-Gooby (1987) analyzed the “private provision of public welfare,”
and research into differences in public-private mixes have been a staple of welfare state
research for more than two decades (e.g. Rein and Rainwater 1986; see also Shalev 1996).
A broader focus on regulatory politics has also been an important focus of political science
research for at least four decades,3 although most research has focused on areas other than
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social policy. With the expansion of the European Union’s activities in the area of social
policy, however, scholarship in this area has begun to focus on the EU’s regulatory role,
emphasizing the ways in which the EU’s role in social policy-making at EU level involves
regulatory politics rather than redistributive politics (see, for example, Leibfried and
Pierson 1994). As Majone (1996) argues, social regulation is related to correcting market
failures and is distinct from both distribution and redistribution. Redistribution and
distribution rely on the instruments of fiscal policy: government spending in order to
achieve specific political goals or fund income maintenance and social service programs.
In contrast, regulation is an exercise in what Lowi (1964) calls “limiting behavior.”
Regulation is aimed at constraining actor behavior in a specific area in order to ensure the
smooth functioning of markets. Regulation does not only limit behavior, however, it can
also encourage specific kinds of market behavior, like occupational pension provision.
Government provision of tax breaks for occupational pension contributions is an obvious
example of this.4
The welfare state literature has also begun to take the politics of social policy regulation
seriously. Hacker’s (2002) work on the regulatory politics of private social insurance in
the United States draws on Pierson’s “new politics of the welfare state” approach, as well
as the insights of historical institutionalism, to argue that the politics of private social
policy is different from the politics of public social policy. This is so because the
institutional characteristics of private social policies generate different sets of actors and
interests than do public social policies. In contrast to public social policies, private ones
are characterized by low political visibility, few redistributive effects, an important role
for “third parties” such as the non-government actors that administer and/or regulate
private social policies, and a potentially low degree of compulsion. These characteristics
generate a politics of policy development marked by low levels of political conflict, the
more or less “easy expansion” of benefits once in place, and concentrated pockets of
support for private social policies.
Despite Hacker’s argument that the politics of private social policy is different from
the politics of public social policy, his analysis confirms historical institutionalism’s key
claim that “policies create politics.” It is precisely because the structure of private social
policies differs so much from public social politics that the political processes generated
by both types of policy are so different. Thus both public and private social policies are
characterized by policy feedback effects and path dependence, but private social policies
are less visible and less influenced by electoral politics than public social policies are.
The work of Myles and Pierson (2001) is also central to our understanding of the political
processes surrounding private occupational pensions. Myles and Pierson identify two
types of “pension politics” in mature welfare states: the “new politics” that characterizes
reform processes in systems dominated by public provision, and a sort of “old politics”
(although they do not use this label) in the countries with multipillar systems. In multipillar
systems, public pension reform is likely to be difficult because of electoral risks, but
change processes in private, but collectively organized occupational pensions are likely
to be much different because “governments do not bear direct responsibility for meeting
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future pension promises.” Moreover, the participation of unions in pension fund
administration will influence how the burden of restructuring or even retrenchment in
occupational pensions (when it occurs) is distributed. What this logic of change shares with
Pierson’s depiction of the “old” politics of welfare is the importance of the power resources
of Left parties and unions in shaping social policy development. Thus even private social
policies can promote solidarity and considerable redistribution if organized labor plays
a significant role in their construction.
Myles and Pierson’s central argument concerning the development of collectively
organized occupational pensions is that government’s role is limited to regulation,
relieving governments of the responsibility of meeting future pension promises. Instead,
decentralized institutions that administer pensions are the actors “on the ground” charged
with negotiating contribution rates, benefit levels, and eligibility – precisely the kinds of
program details that legislatures negotiate for public pension schemes. These decentralized
actors are also responsible for managing pension schemes’ adherence to the regulatory
framework set up by the state, including funding requirements. The latter is especially
important for funded schemes like those in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark.
And because organized labor is well-represented on the boards of pension schemes in many
multipillar countries, labor’s preferences will be one of the factors shaping change
processes in occupational pensions, including adjustment to financial market downturns.
To sum up, the welfare state literature suggests two ways of thinking about institutional
change within multipillar pension systems. First, the historical institutionalist approach
extrapolates from Pierson’s “new politics” approach to argue that policy feedbacks are
every bit as consequential in private occupational pensions as they are in public pensions
(e.g. Hacker). This approach takes as its point of departure Pierson’s key insight that
“extensive policy arrangements are also fundamental institutional frameworks that create
rules, constraints, and incentives for future political action.” Second pillar occupational
pensions by definition are not publicly provided, but they are significantly shaped by public
regulation, and there is ample reason to believe that policy feedbacks apply to private
provisions much as they do for public provisions. The difference is the role of regulation
rather than direct provision (Hacker; Myles and Pierson).
Drawing on Pierson’s emphasis on policy design as a source of institutional constraint,
the key argument for the present purposes is that occupational pension schemes generate
their own sources of support, shape interest group activity and produce adaptive expectations
(just as public schemes do). They also produce sunk costs in the form of existing pension
commitments. Following Myles and Pierson (2001), the scope and extent of pension
commitments are a key variable driving institutional change. Although Myles and
Pierson’s claim concerns public schemes, there is ample reason to believe that sunk costs
are just as consequential for private social policy, but the key difference is that market
processes, rather than electoral processes, channel change processes in private social
social policy. In short, we need to know the “scope of existing commitments” in order to
understand the politics of occupational pension reform.
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A second set of arguments is based more specifically on Hacker’s recent work on the
interplay of public and private welfare provisions in the United States. Rather than
analyzing private social policy as a set of institutions with predictable feedback effects,
the Hackerian approach (drawing on Rein and Rainwater (1986) and others) emphasizes
the interplay of public and private social insurance development. Trampusch’s (2007)
work is a good example of this approach. She brings ‘labour relations’ back into the study
of retrenchment, analyzing how the expansion of collectively bargained welfare facilitates
public social policy retrenchment because public tasks can be offloaded onto collective
agreements.5 A key focus of this type of research is the ways in which the timing and
sequencing of public social policy adoption and expansion shapes private social policy
development. Thus the expansion of private social policy should decrease demands for
public social policies, and vice versa.
What does this brief review of the literature on private social policy suggest for the study
of multipillar pension schemes confronted with financial market instability? First, the
ways in which individual pension schemes adjust to financial downturns and investment
losses is heavily conditioned by the interplay of their institutional characteristics and the
structure of government regulation. Second, the process of occupational pension adjustment,
even when it involves retrenchment, should be marked by low visibility, low levels of
political conflict, and unclear accountability. Those who witness their pension rights
shrink in the wake of financial market turbulence have no one to blame but the market.
A Brief Introduction to Occupational Pensions and their
Regulation
Arguing that occupational pension design and regulation have feedback effects requires
some discussion of the salient features of these schemes. Without getting into too much
detail, I will discuss these features along three dimensions: benefits, administration, and
funding requirements.
Benefits   Broadly speaking there are two ways to design occupational pension benefits:
defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB). In its purest form, a DC scheme
involves an individual account in which participants save for retirement. The contributions
are often co-financed or fully financed by employers. The principal and income earned by
the investments in the account are then converted to an annuity at retirement or simply
withdrawn at regular intervals after retirement.6 There is no insurance or compensation for
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bad financial decisions or market turmoil; returns are completely dependent on the level
of contributions and investment performance.
A DB scheme, in contrast, is based on a promise by the pension scheme sponsor to pay
an employee a specific benefit at retirement. These schemes may be pre-funded or paid
out of current payroll costs, but the key difference with DC schemes is that the size of the
pension benefit is fixed in advance, and contribution levels are adjusted as necessary to
finance pension benefits. Typical DB occupational schemes pay some percentage (often
60  %) of average earnings or the final salary after 40 years of service. Obviously, the
number of years required for a full pension, annual rate of pension accumulation, and the
reference salary (final salary, average salary) used to calculated the pension level vary
greatly across schemes.
These two “pure” types obscure the ways in which the DB-DC distinction is really a
continuum rather than two mutually exclusive categories. As the discussions of the Danish
and Swiss cases below will demonstrate, DC schemes may include elements associated
with DB schemes, such as guaranteed rates of return and collective, rather than individual
membership. When these parameters apply to DC schemes, the individual bears much less
risk than in a pure DC scheme. Similarly, DB schemes often incorporate features more
commonly associated with DC schemes, such as making a portion of the pension dependent
on investment returns. The Dutch case is a good example of this.
Regulation
Whereas pension providers have some choice about how to design benefits, they are usually
constrained by the regulatory framework in terms of the degree of compulsion, the
structure of administration and funding requirements. Rules concerning these three
dimensions of occupational pensions are typically set out in national legislation.
Compulsion   One of the distinctive characteristics of occupational pensions in many
European countries is the high degree of compulsion. Governments have three options:
require employers to provide occupational pension coverage, delegate this issue to
collective bargaining, or rely on voluntary provision. Switzerland is an example of the first
strategy, Denmark and the Netherlands of the second, and the United Kingdom of the third.
Administration   Occupational schemes vary enormously in terms of administrative
structure. Broadly speaking, occupational pensions may be organized as company
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schemes, sectoral (multi-employer) schemes, or professional schemes. This dimension
determines the size and structure of the risk pool. The next key dimension is the
composition of administrative boards: are employers solely responsible for pensions and
entitled to make all relevant decisions, as in the UK? Or do corporatist boards with
representatives of both unions and employers run things, as in Denmark, Switzerland and
the Netherlands? Are pensioners represented on these boards? As Myles and Pierson
(2001) argue, these administrative boards are key actors in occupational pension politics
because they make the key decisions about benefit formulae, contribution rates, eligibility,
and investment policy.
Funding   The term “full funding” is deceptive because its meaning varies enormously
across countries. The first key parameter that determines the definition of full funding is
the distinction between group life insurance contracts and pension funds.7 Insurers are
required to maintain a minimum capital base in addition to the assets dedicated to covering
future liabilities,8 whereas pension funds are (generally speaking) only required to
maintain assets sufficient to cover liabilities.9 In other words, capital requirements are
higher for insurers than for pension funds. A second key parameter is the specific nature
of funding requirements: the required level of funding (as percent of liabilities); the
method for calculating the value of future liabilities; and the rules governing over- and
underfunding, including the ownership of surpluses and liability for deficits. Given that
life insurance is regulated by EU legislation and pension funds less so,10 national
authorities have much leeway in tailoring pension fund legislation to national needs than
they do for insurance-based occupational pension schemes.
There is a wide range of regulatory activity in the occupational pension world. At one
extreme are the loosely regulated occupational pension sectors in the UK and USA, where
tax breaks stimulate occupational pension provision, but employers enjoy considerable
latitude in organizing schemes, and the rules governing the definition and level of funding
as well as investment policy are less strict than in many other European countries. At the
other end of the regulatory spectrum are the national occupational sectors where there are
quantitative and other restrictions11 on investment policy and tough requirements concerning
capital coverage of liabilities, in addition to the tax breaks that encourage occupational
pension provision.12
Regulatory requirements will shape the extent to which pension promises are backed
by full funding (actually existing financial assets), how much time pension providers have
to correct underfunding, and the ownership of surpluses and deficits. Regulatory frameworks
typically also place constraints on investment policy – where (domestically or
internationally) and how (stocks, bonds, real estate) managers invest assets. In addition,
regulation may include rules concerning guaranteed interest rates in DC schemes and the
legal status of accumulated pension rights in DB schemes.
To summarize, the most salient features of occupational pension structure and
regulation are:
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1. DB v DC benefit formulae
2. employer v. corporatist administration
3. the degree of compulsion
4. solvency rules
5. investment restrictions
These rules shape actor expectations about pension provision, empower certain actors
over others, and shape the adjustment of pension providers to market fluctuations,
particularly the distrbution of financial market gains and losses.
Occupational Pension Structure and Regulation in the
Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark
This section discusses the key features of Swiss, Danish and Dutch occupational pensions
in light of the general characteristics sketched above. I begin with the legal basis of
occupational pension schemes. Occupational pension schemes are typically of two types:
sectoral, professional and company pension funds or life insurance contracts.13 The
Netherlands relies almost exclusively on pension funds, whereas life insurance contracts
dominate occupational pension provision in Denmark. Switzerland uses both.14 Table 1
shows the distribution of occupational pension assets between pension funds and life
insurers. In all three countries, occupational pension assets exceed GDP.
Besides the distinction between insurance and pension funds, there is considerable
variation in the design of pre-funded, mandatory occupational pensions in Switzerland,
Denmark and the Netherlands.15 First, only in Switzerland are occupational pensions
mandatory. In Denmark and the Netherlands, pensions are quasi-mandatory in the sense
that they are negotiated as part of collective agreements that cover more than 90 % of the
labor force. Second, Danish and Swiss occupational pensions are mostly defined contribution
(DC), which means that pension benefits depend on the level and length of contributions
as well as the investment performance of pension assets. This also means that individuals
bear much of the risk of investment performance unless there is a minimum rate of return,
which is the case in Switzerland and often in Denmark. Dutch occupational pensions are
mostly defined benefit (DB), although they are beginning to look more like defined
contribution schemes in that benefits are in many ways contingent on investment returns
(van Riel and Ponds 2007). Finally, there is variation in the extent of employee influence
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on investment decisions. In all three countries, both employees and employers are
represented on the boards of pension funds and life insurance schemes that make decisions
about asset allocation, benefits and contributions. In the case of underfunding, these boards
also decide how to restore financial balance, typically by increasing contributions,
adjusting the benefit formula, adjusting the annual indexation of pension accrual and
payments, or some combination of these measures.
Table 1: Second Pillar Pension Assets
Source: European Foundation for Retirement Provision (2008)
Second Pillar Pension Assets 2005 and 2006   
Billions of euros      
        2006   
 2005 2006 
Pension  
funds 
Group  
insurance 
Book 
reserves 
Austria 21.92 23.32 12.56 1.30 9.46 
Belgium 45.80 47.17 14.21 32.96   
Denmark 149.60 165.70 59.70 106.00   
Finland 9.91 10.33 5.53 4.80   
France 140.00 150.00       
Germany 401.50 413.55 93.32 46.76 273.47 
Hungary 2.60 2.70 2.70     
Ireland 77.83 87.70 78.93 8.77   
Italy 50.05 51.48 43.29 3.64 4.55 
Netherlands 722.38 780.00 690.00 90.00   
Portugal 7.78 8.69 8.69     
Spain 95.14 98.34 55.80 31.02 11.50 
Sweden 155.80 160.47 12.46 133.08 14.94 
United Kingdom 1496.00 1557.00 1423.00 134.00   
EU TOTAL 3376.32 3551.32 2500.19 592.33 313.90 
            
Iceland 1.42 1.62 1.62     
Norway 93.19 98.00 23.00 75.00   
Switzerland 533.73 549.74 355.85 193.89   
Europe Total 4004.65 4200.68 2880.66 861.22 313.90 
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Denmark
In Denmark, occupational pensions (labor market pensions, or arbejdsmarkedpensioner)
have been mandatory components of collective agreements since 1991. Prior to this,
several groups were covered by occupational pensions, including civil servants, but most
wage earners had to make do with the basic pension and the other public schemes (ATP
and SP)16 because political stalemate prevented the expansion of public earnings-related
scheme (see Green-Pedersen (2007), Due and Madsen (2003) and Anderson (2005) for
details). The social partners stepped in where legislation failed, taking the first steps
toward comprehensive second pillar coverage in 1989. Unions for unskilled public sector
workers negotiated a separate pension deal as part of their wage agreement. Metalworkers
took similar steps in 1991, setting a precedent for the rest of the private sector. The coverage
rate of occupational pensions was 93 % in the early 2000s up from about 33 % in the late
1970s.
The substantial extension of occupational coverage is rooted in debates about economic
democracy. The 1985 LO Congress adopted a proposal drawn up by experts within the
Confederation of Manual Workers (LO) that aimed at providing pensions equal to two
thirds of previous salary. The report came after several years of debate about economic
democracy and how to increase union influence on investment and ownership. When these
efforts failed, union leaders saw occupational pensions as an opportunity to expand union
influence on investment. The defined-benefit approach to pension design dominated
occupational provision at the time, but union leaders thought active union influence on
investment was more compatible with a defined-contribution approach.17 Moreover, in the
1980s, nurses (all in the public sector) negotiated an occupational scheme organized along
DC lines, and this later became the model for other blue collar schemes (interview LO
February 2008). Thus Danish unions’ agreement to DC schemes is largely a historical
coincidence, and the DC/DB distinction is not much of an issue.
Both government and business leaders were sympathetic to LO’s approach: the
government wanted to close existing civil servant schemes because they were too
expensive, and employers’ main concern was to have certainty regarding contribution rates
as well as a guarantee against union control over investment. The result was a compromise
in which employers and employees each paid one half of contributions and unions choose
the president of the pension fund. In 1991 Pension Denmark was created, and in 1992
Industriens Pension, two of the largest pension providers for unskilled workers. Pension
Denmark has 540,000 members employed in 35,000 private and public enterprises and
€ 9.3 billion in assets. Industriens Pension has 350,000 members at 8,000 employers.
Employers were satisfied with the new occupational pensions because they had a guarantee
against economic democracy. Unions gained not only additional pension provision but also
influence on investment decisions.
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Occupational pensions schemes in Denmark are regulated as life insurance companies.18
Employers typically pay 2/3 of contributions and employees 1/3, ranging from approximately
10 to 17 percent of wages. All types of pension funds are governed by an administrative
board with parity representation of employees and employers. Most schemes are defined
contribution (DC), and the most common form of pension product is the traditional life
insurance annuity with a guaranteed interest rate, although unit-linked pension products
in which the individual bears all investment risk are becoming more common (IMF 2006).
However, the two largest pension funds for manual workers, PensionDenmark and
Industripension, do not provide a minimum guaranteed interest rate. A typical manual
worker with 40 years of contributions will receive about 90 % of previous net income
(including the basic pension and the other public scheme, ATP) when the labor market
pension schemes are fully mature, starting in about 2020 (ØEM 2005: 11).19 The combined
first and second pillar replacement rate is much higher for low income employees because
the basic pension plays a larger role. Between 2000 and 2050, the share of the labor market
pension scheme in a typical manual worker’s retirement income package will rise from
less than 5 % to more than 35 % (ØEM 2005: 17).
Contributions to labor market pension schemes have increased rapidly since 1970. In
1970 contributions were slightly more than 1 % of GDP and had risen to almost 3.5 % of
GDP in 2005 (ØEM 2005: 7). This trend reflects the extension of labor market pensions
to almost all groups on the labor market in 1991 as well as the gradual increase in
contributions.
A crucial feature of many of these DC schemes is that they have a guaranteed minimum
rate of return on assets. Investment returns above this rate are reserved for periods when
investment returns are below the minimum rate, and for supplemented the gauranteed rate
of return. These undistributed profits or “collective bonus potential” have fluctuated
sharply with asset markets, dropping from about 10 % in 2000 to about 2 % in 2002 and
back up to about 4 % in 2004 (ØEM 2005: 30).20 Even the pension funds that do not use
a minimum guarantee, chiefly PensionDenmark and Industripension, provide a “soft”
guarantee in that they specify a target minimum rate of return. Many new entrants to the
labor market participate in schemes with a soft interest rate guarantee. From 1982 to 1994,
the guaranteed interest rate was 4.5 %. This was reduced to 2.5 % in 1994 and to 1.5 % in
1995 (Danmarks Nationalbank 2008, 30).
The Danish regulatory framework requires occupational pension schemes to be fully
funded at all times. Pension funds organized according to life insurance principles must
maintain a capital reserve in excess of the assets dedicated to pension liabilities. Pension
funds must submit annual reports for the pensions regulator (Danish Financial Services
Authority); in the case of underfunding, the pension fund must submit a recovery plan to
the regulator. These tough requirements create incentives for pension schemes to pursue
somewhat conservative investment policies. The regulatory framework limits pension
funds’ and life insurance plans’ investments in shares to 50 % of assets, and administrative
committees with representatives of employees and employers make investment allocation
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decisions. In 2000, equities were 30 % of investments, but after the stock market downturn,
the proportion dropped to 15 % in 2005. Bonds made up 51 % of investments in 2000 and
56 % in 2005 (IMF 2006).
Switzerland
Swiss occupational pensions (BVG/LPP) have been mandatory since 1985. Wages
between CHF 22,575 (the maximum basic pension; see appendix) and CHF 77,440 are
compulsorily insured, and coverage beyond this level is optional. Most schemes aim to
provide a replacement rate of 60-70 % of previous income for employees with average
earnings, including the basic pension. Each pension scheme is administered by a board
including representatives of employers and employees.21 Second pillar pension assets are
substantial: in 2005 there were CHF 545.3 billion stocked away in pension funds.
Contributions to occupational schemes in 2005 were 1.5 times that of the public scheme,
although expenditures were about equal.22 As in Denmark, investment policies are
somewhat conservative, with substantial investment in bonds. In 2003, 31.5 % of assets
were in Swiss bonds, 15 % in foreign bonds, 16 % in Swiss equities, and 21.7 % in foreign
equities.
The 1985 reform extended and formalized an already extensive system of occupational
pension coverage. In many ways, labelling Swiss occupational pensions “private” is a
misnomer because of the high degree of compulsion and regulation concerning financing,
benefits, and administration. Most occupational pensions in the private sector are
organized as notional defined contribution (NDC) schemes. This means that participants
have an individual notional account into which pension rights (a legally defined minimum
percentage of annual salary) are credited.23 Notional contributions are not the same as
actual contributions, however; pension schemes can use a uniform contribution rate for
all ages or stick to the age-related contribution schedule.24 Credits to notional accounts
range from age-related minimum levels of 7 % to 18 % of gross earnings.25
Swiss federalism contributes to the fragmentation of occupational pension provision.
At the end of 2006, there were 2,669 occupational pension providers. The overwhelming
majority (2,512) of these pension schemes provide coverage to employees at workplaces
with fewer than 1,000 employees; 77.5 % of employees are members of 157 pension
schemes contracted by employers with more than 1,000 employees (BFS 2008: 13).
Financial supervision is similarly fragmented: the Federal Social Insurance Office
supervises pension providers operating nationwide and oversees the financial supervisory
authorities in the 26 cantons. In other words, there is both national-level and canton-level
supervision.
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Like Denmark, there is a minimum rate of return on contributions, but unlike Denmark
this applies to all occupational pensions. The minimum interest rate in 2008 is 2.75 %. The
federal government sets the minimum interest rate, so the value of an individual’s notional
account depends on the length of contributions, the level of notional contributions and the
minimum interest rate. 40 years of contributions are required for a full occupational
pension (39 for women, increasing to 40 in a few years). At retirement, the capital in an
individual’s notional account is converted to an annuity using a government-mandated
gender-neutral conversion rate, currently 7.1.26 This means the notional capital in an
individual’s account is divided by 7.1 at retirement to determine the annual pension
amount. This formula yields the legally-required minimum rate of pension compensation,
but employers are free to pay more. Many schemes in the public sector are based on a
defined benefit formula, but this is trending toward NDC.
Until a 2003 reform, oversight of pension funds was not very strict. The regulatory
framework required parity (unions-employer) representation on pension fund boards,
yearly audits and the vague requirement that pension funds be able to meet all obligations.
There were no specific provisions for underfunding or the ownership of surpluses. As
Bonoli and Haüsermann (2007) report, this vagueness contributed to the deficits of many
pension funds in the wake of the 2001-2002 stock market downturn. In the boom years
before 2001, many private sector pension funds had distributed excess profits to shareholders
despite the pension funds’ non-profit status. And when investment returns went south,
these same pension funds were among those most vociferously lobbying the government
for a decrease in the minimum interest rate. The 2003 reform addresses this weakness by
clarifying the rules concerning surpluses, underfunding, and the valuation of assets and
liabilities.
Netherlands27
The Dutch pension system has attracted much international attention because of its
solidaristic structure of risk-pooling within sectors and firms (Clark 2003). More than
90 % of employees participate in the approximately 650 sectoral, company and professional
pension schemes. Pension schemes are mostly defined benefit (DB), and until recently
most schemes used a final salary benefit formula in which a benefit equal to 70 % of the
final wage (including the state pension, the AOW; see appendix) could be accumulated
over 35 (or more) years. More than 90 % of employees are still covered by DB schemes,
but most plans combine features of DC with DB, because the extent to which the DB
promise is met depends on the performance of the pension scheme’s investments as well
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as the ratio of active members (current employees who pay contributions) to retired
members.
As in Denmark and Switzerland, there is strict supervision of pension fund solvency.
In the past, the typical approach to maintaining 100 % coverage of liabilities was to adjust
the contribution rate, but following the 2000-2001 stock market downturn, many pension
funds actually reduced future benefits (see below). About 40 % of assets are invested in
equities (33 percentage points of which are foreign) and 38 % in bonds. Bi-partite pension
fund boards make investment allocation decisions.
Occupational Pension Retrenchment
One of the great virtues of Dutch, Swiss and Danish second pillar pensions is strict financial
supervision. The relevant regulatory agency monitors pension funds and prescribes
procedures for restoring balance to underfunded schemes. This encourages relatively
prudent investment strategies – assets must be managed outside the firm or employer, and
the asset mix should enable the plan sponsor to meet all liabilities. However, even the most
prudently-run pension schemes are not immune to the vagaries of asset markets. Indeed,
Swiss, Danish and Dutch second pillar pensions have experienced considerable retrenchment
since the beginning of the 2000s.
The 2001-2002 stock market downturn had immediate repercussions in Switzerland,
Denmark and the Netherlands because of the requirement that all liabilities be fully funded.
The regulatory framework in each of the three countries specifies different methods for
estimating the value of assets and liabilities and each uses a different definition of
minimum full funding. Despite these differences, as well as differences in exposure to the
stock market, falling share prices pulled the coverage ratio (the ratio of assets to liabilities)
below the required level, and this prompted immediate measures in the Netherlands and
Switzerland, both by governments and by pension fund boards. Denmark was less affected.
For example, the Swiss government decreased the guaranteed minimum interest rate for
DC schemes from 4 % to 3.25 % in 2002, and again in 2005 to 2.5 %. Despite these remedial
measures, experts estimated that one in five Swiss pension schemes was underfunded in
2002, for a total deficit of €32 billion. Danish schemes avoided this fate partly because they
had already decreased the guaranteed interest rate from 4.5 % to 2.5 % in 1994, and further
to 1.5 % in 1999. Moreover, most Danish pension schemes could draw on undistributed
profits from previous years to compensate for heavy losses. Another factor that limited
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the damage in Denmark was the immaturity of many occupational pension schemes. The
level of accumulated pension rights was simply not as high as it was in Switzerland and
the Netherlands.
The 2008 financial crisis caused a new round pension fund retrenchment in Denmark
and Switzerland. In Denmark there were few outright benefit cuts, but heavy financial
losses prompted the Danish Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Danish Insurance
Association to negotiate a temporary suspension of short-term solvency calculations in
October order to prevent a massive sell-off of pension assets by pension funds trying to
restore full funding. Because pension assets and liabilities are valued at market rates, short-
term losses have an immediate effect on solvency ratios; the suspension of short-term
solvency calculations gives pension funds flexibility in restoring solvency (Valentine
2008). Despite heavy losses, very few pension funds fell below legally required solvency
levels; pension funds tapped into their considerable reserves to make up for investment
losses as they did in 2001 and 2002.
Swiss occupational pension funds have also absorbed heavy losses in 2008. In 2006,
Swiss funds were still in the process of recovering from the heavy losses of the 2001-2002
downturn. At the end of 2006, the combined deficit in occupational pension funds was CHF
17.8 billion, or 7.4 % (BFS 2008: 8). The 2008 financial crisis reversed this positive trend.
The experience of the Pictet BVG Index (composed of 75 % bonds and 25 % equities),
widely used by pension funds, illustrates this trend: the Pictet BVG Index lost 9.62 % in
the first ten months of 2008. In October 2008, the government negotiated a decrease in the
minimum interest rate from 2.75 % to 2.0 %, to take effect in 2009 (Ottawa 2008). This
decrease must also be viewed in the context of a scheduled decreased in the annuity
conversion rate from 7.1 % to 6.8 % starting in 2014.28 The Swiss parliament is currently
considering additional reductions in the conversion rate.
Dutch Retrenchment
The Dutch case differs in several ways from Denmark and Switzerland because occupational
pension coverage is dominated by defined benefit plans. This section provides more detail
about occupational restructuring in the Netherlands in order to highlight the interaction
of institutional design and regulatory rules and practices in shaping the restructuring
process.
The 2000-2002 stock market downturn prompted substantial cuts in pension benefits,
sharp premium increases, and led to a tense renegotiation about the regulations governing
the coverage rate of occupational pensions. Since the early 1990s, most Dutch pension
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funds had been investing significantly in equities (30-40 % of assets), so when stock prices
fell, the pension funds sustained heavy losses. The reserves of many pension funds fell
below the required 105 % coverage rate for the first time in 2002. The drastic deterioration
of the financial position of many funds prompted the pensions regulator, PVK, to introduce
tougher rules governing pension fund solvency. For most funds, restoring solvency meant
increasing premiums, suspending pension indexation, or both.
The investment losses sustained by occupational pension schemes are surprising
considering that only a few years ago, many funds had such large surpluses that employers
and workers enjoyed premium rebates or so-called “premium holidays,” periods during
which no contributions were paid. For example, Unilever Corporation enjoyed contribution
holidays for 8 years in the 1990s. Pension fund surpluses were sometimes so large that
employers could withdraw funds from them. Unilever received more than € 1 billion in
rebates between 1991 and 2001 (Van het Kar 2004). The Shell Corporation also enjoyed
several years of premium holidays. The premium holiday seems to have been more
common among company pension funds, but sectoral pensions funds also profited from
buoyant stock market returns in the 1990s. Pension funds used some of the excess profits
to lower contributions or finance the restructuring of costly early retirement schemes.
Large pension fund surpluses attracted the attention of pensioners who were not about
to stand idly by as pension funds “spent” investment gains on items other than pension
payouts. Pensioners claimed that the money (or some of it) belonged to them. Indeed, the
Dutch Association of Pensioners’ Organizations (NVOG) announced it would legally
challenge Shell and Unilever about their use of pension surpluses, claiming that pensioners
should have a share of the profits. Estimates are that about NLG 1.5 billion was returned
to firms in 1999 (van het Kaar, 2001). Pension fund surpluses also sparked an upsurge in
pensioner organizing: 12 firm-specific pensioner organizations were formed between
1998 and 2000.29
The profit-driven premium holidays came to an abrupt halt in 2001. In 2001, pension
funds lost an average of -2.8 % after averaging gains of 10 % per year for a decade. In 2002
in the wake of substantial stock market losses, the social partners and pension funds joined
to pressure government to relax rules about the coverage ratio (the ratio between assets
and liabilities). The average coverage ratio was 118 % at the end of 2001, down from
139 % in 1999 (table 2).
Two factors exacerbated the effects of the stock market downturn. First, the method for
calculating pension fund liabilities (until 2002) yielded optimistic estimates of the
coverage ratio. In the 1990s, pension funds were probably also underfunded, but the method
for calculating liabilities was based on a discount rate (4 %) that underestimated liabilities.
In the context of good investment returns, this meant that funds could lower premiums or
even cancel them altogether, and the social partners could use the extra capital to finance
benefit improvements. In other words, pension funds underestimated their liabilities at a
time when stock markets were booming. This created the illusion of overfunding. A CPB
report estimated that the underfunding rate was about 30 % in the early 2000s (Westerhout
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et al., 2004: 14). When interest rates began to fall in the late 1990s, the 4 % discount rate
for estimating liabilities was out of line with the market. Since 2002 (see below) the
discount rate of return has been replaced by a fair market rate. Moreover, funds had
increased their investments in shares to about 50 % so when share prices fell, pension funds
were much more exposed to investment risks than in the past.
In September 2002, the pensions regulator (PVK) issued stricter rules for pension fund
solvency for the first time ever. The new rules required funds at risk of falling below the
100 % coverage requirement to notify the PVK and draw up a recovery plan for restoring
balance within one year. The PVK also raised the coverage requirement to 105 %. At the
same time, however, the social partners were pushing in the opposite direction. Instead of
tougher solvency rules, unions, employers and pension funds pressed the government for
more flexibility for pension funds to restore solvency. In 2002, about one third of funds
were in the danger zone. The Association of Company Pension Funds (Opf) and the
Association of Industry-wide Pension Funds (VB) immediately criticized the PVK’s
move, saying that the new requirements were too strict and would have negative
macroeconomic effects because pension funds would have to increase contributions,
suspend indexing, or both. Employers and unions joined in these objections, but the PVK
maintained its strict position. The planned reform of the regulatory framework governing
occupational pension funds (Pensioen- en spaarfondsenwet, PSW) provided an opportunity
for the pension fund organizations and the social partners to press their case (see below).
The heavy stock market losses in 2001 and 2002 also sparked collective bargaining
conflict in 2003 as employers tried to introduce changes into pension schemes to reduce
costs and restore solvency. Most schemes adopted a mix of measures to restore solvency:
suspended benefit indexation; non-indexation of accrual; contribution increases; and
switching to average earnings benefit formulas. At the end of 2002, 60 % of company funds
were in danger of underfunding. Unions indicated their willingness to compromise, as long
as de-indexation was temporary (Grünell 2003). The experience of the Netherlands’ largest
pension fund, ABP (for civil servants)30 illustrates the dilemmas faced by most pension
funds: the value of assets fell by 7.2 % to € 135.5 billion at the end of 2002. To restore
adequate coverage, the bi-partite board of the ABP raised premiums substantially and
announced a switch from final salary benefit formula to average career earnings formula
starting in 2004.31 Pension premiums for the ABP increased from 11.6 % of qualifying
income (above the basic pension level) to a peak in 1996 21.4 % in 2005 before falling to
19.2 % in 2007 (table 3; ABP various years).
Source: DNB.
Table 2: Average coverage ratios for occupational pension funds 1996-2004, in percent
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 126 133 139 132 118 101 104 
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Note: the contribution rate is different from the cost of occupational pension contributions as
percent of payroll since the contribution is only paid on the salary above the AOW franchise.
Rates exclude early retirement schemes.
Source: ABP, various years.
The measures taken by ABP illustrate a broader trend among pension schemes: the massive
shift from final benefit schemes to average salary schemes. Only 10 % of active
participants are in final salary plans in 2004, down from 50 % in 2003 and 66 % in 1998.
About 75 % now participate in average salary schemes and indexation is overwhelmingly
conditional on fund solvency (DNB 2005). As Ponds and van Riel (2007: 6) document,
occupational pension premiums (for all pension funds, not just ABP) have increased by
83 % in the period 2000-2005.
To sum up, the stock market downturn of 2001-2002 forced rapid changes in occupational
pensions. Pension funds increased premiums drastically, suspended or reduced the
indexation of accrued pension rights, and froze or partially indexed pension payouts. Most
pension funds followed a strategy of spreading the pain across current workers and current
retirees, but it is clear that for many groups of current workers, the shift to average salary
schemes is a substantial deterioration in pension provision. This adjustment pattern breaks
with previous practice. In the past, pension funds adjusted the contribution rate to
fluctuations in liabilities, so current pensioners were largely spared from cost-cutting
measures. The 2001-2002 stock market downturn was the first time that pensioners had
to share some of the costs of adjustment.
Table 3: ABP contribution rate 1996-2007
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Contribution 
rate 
(employers 
and 
employees) 
 
11.6 
 
12.6 
 
13.4 
 
13.4 
 
13.6 
 
11.8 
 
13.6 
 
15.6 
 
19.0 
 
21.4 
 
19.4 
 
19.2 
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Revision of the PSW
Even before the 2001-2002 stock market downturn, revision of the regulatory framework
(PSW) had been lingering for several years on the political back burner. The stock market
downturn exposed the weakness of the existing regulatory framework and pushed PSW to
the top of the political agenda. Policy-makers focused on two issues: updating rules for
calculating the coverage ratio and clarifying the “ownership” of both pension fund deficits
and surpluses. The boom years of the 1990s led to conflict about which groups were entitled
to pension fund surpluses, and the stock market downturn of 2001/2002 led to conflict about
which groups should bear the burden of correcting investment losses. The PSW gave the
PVK considerable latitude to determine the rules for solvency, and the PVK quickly made
use of this by issuing tough rules for restoring full funding (see previous section). At the
same time, reform of the PSW was considered incomplete, and with the change of
government in 2002, the initiative rested with the center-right coalition led by the Christian
Democrats. What the social partners and pension fund organizations could not get from
the pensions regulator (more flexibility for restoring the coverage rate), they now tried to
achieve within the reform of the PSW.
The legislative process has been time-consuming. The Social-Economic Council (SER)
issued its opinion in May 2001 (SER 2001), and the Christian Democratic-led government
introduced the bill to the Second Chamber in March 2002. In November 2004, a draft of
the bill was sent to interested parties for comment. Predictably, the pension funds, backed
by the social partners, pleaded for more flexible rules governing solvency, but the cabinet
(backed by the pensions regulator) stood firm. The pension funds argued that the rule that
105 % coverage be restored within one year was too tough. Coverage rates dropped
substantially in 2002 and 2003, and pension funds were still dealing with the negative
effects of this. In 1997 the coverage rate was 126 % of liabilities and in 2003 it had fallen
to 104 % (DNB 2005).
The new legislation took effect in 2007 and has three goals: to increase transparency;
clarify the roles of the social partners, pension fund/insurance company, and pensioners;
and to modernize the rules governing pension fund solvency. Pension funds will be
required to inform participants about their pension accrual, and issues like what to do in
cases of under or overfunding will be clarified. The law also changes how the present value
of pension liabilities are calculated. Rather than discounting the liabilities at a fixed rate
of 4 %, funds will use a market rate. If interest rates go up, the present value of liabilities
decreases.32 The proposal also introduces a ‘minimum test’ and a solvency test in order
to get pension funds to increase their buffer funds. The minimum is essentially the coverage
rate (the ratio of assets to liabilities plus a minimum capital requirement; 105 %) while
the solvency test is a complicated buffer arrangement.33 These two provisions mean that
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pension funds should aim for a funding level of 125 %. If the coverage ratio drops below
125 % (the solvency level), pension funds have 15 years to restore balance; if the coverage
ratio drops below 105 %, pension funds have three years to restore balance.
Before the 2001-2002 stock market downturn, the regulatory framework set out in the
PSW was somewhat vague on the issue of pension fund solvency. The supervision of the
pension funds was not very strict, either (Ponds and van Riel, 2007). To be sure, the PSW
required that pension liabilities be funded, but it was silent on the issue of how exactly to
calculate assets and liabilities. Pension funds operated using a rule of thumb: liabilities
should be calculated using a fixed discount rate of 4 % and 100 % of liabilities should be
covered. If the coverage rate was in danger of falling below 100 %, pension funds would
raise contributions. This method worked for the postwar period, but the liberalization of
financial markets and falling interest rates changed things. Pension funds started to invest
more in equities, and interest rates fell below 4 %. When the stock market dropped, pension
funds were more exposed to this risk at the same time that their liabilities were
underestimated. The new pension law deals with these realities by introducing a fair market
valuation of liabilities and requiring pension funds to clarify what their indexation policy
is.
The 2008 financial crisis provided the first tough test of the new supervisory framework.
By the end of October, the average coverage ratio for pension funds had fallen to 109 %,
prompting most pension funds to announce that they would probably have to suspend or
decrease the indexation of pension rights and pension pay-outs. ABP, the largest Dutch
pension fund, saw its assets decrease by 9.8 % in value between January and September
2008, pulling its coverage rate down from 140 % to 118 % (Henderson 2008). The pensions
regulator, the Dutch Central Bank, extended the deadline for pension funds to submit both
short-term and long-term recovery plans by six months in order to wait for markets to calm
and to give pension funds more flexibility in meeting funding requirements (DNB 2008).
Measuring the Damage
Anyone who studies pension systems and welfare retrenchment knows how difficult it is
to measure “retrenchment” in pension generosity. It is similarly difficult to determine the
extent to which retrenchment has occurred in occupational pension schemes. As a first cut,
I draw on standard definitions of public pension retrenchment to get some idea of which
aspects of occupational pension coverage have deteriorated. This is easier to do for a
defined benefit scheme than it is for a defined contribution scheme, because in the latter
the individual bears more risk anyway. Table 4 summarizes the ways in which occupational
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pension coverage has deteriorated in Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands. The table
does this by examining aspects of benefit generosity and the structure of financing.
The extent of retrenchment in pre-funded second pillar pensions depicted in table 6 is
in some ways greater than the cuts enacted in many Western European public pension
schemes in the 1990s and 2000s. It is hard to find a public pension reform equivalent to
the massive cuts in the Dutch civil servants pension scheme, for example. And it is difficult
to think of a public pension reform that cuts future benefits by about 25 % as the recent
changes in the Swiss minimum interest rate do.
These very serious and very rapid deteriorations in occupational pension coverage
occurred without much public debate in the Netherlands, because the bi-partite pension
fund boards that administer pension schemes made decisions about how to restore
solvency, and they used the levers they had at their disposal: raising contributions,
decreasing future benefits and temporarily suspending indexation. Decreases in the
minimum interest rate in Switzerland, in contrast, were the topic of public debate, because
Table 4: Retrenchment in Second Pillar Pensions
 NETHERLANDS DENMARK SWITZERLAND 
Nominal benefit 
levels 
• major shift from final 
salary DB to average 
salary DB 
• shift from DB to DC 
• probable decrease in 
payouts from 
"collective bonus 
potential" 
• interest rate for 
individual DC 
accounts falls from 
4% in 2002 to 
3.25%; then to  2.5% 
in 2005. 
• Increase in mandatory 
interest rate to 2.75% 
in 2008. 
• Decrease in 
mandatory interest 
rate to 2.0% in 2009. 
• Decrease in annuity 
conversion rate from 
7.1% to 6.8% in 
2014. 
• shift from DB to DC 
 
Indexation of 
pension accrual 
and pension 
payouts 
• now dependent on 
fund solvency 
• not applicable see above 
Level of 
contributions 
• 81% increase in 
pension contributions 
2000-2007 
• no change • data not available 
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the Federal Council sets the rate.34 The key to understanding the speed and depth of
retrenchment, however, is the constraints created by regulatory framework. In both
Switzerland and the Netherlands, the supervisory framework left little room for temporary
periods of underfunding, so pension funds in the Netherlands and the Federal Council in
Switzerland adopted difficult measures to restore solvency quickly.
Discussion and Conclusion
The literature on welfare state retrenchment in general and pension reform in particular
has focused almost overwhelmingly on the distributional politics associated with reforming
public systems of social provision (Pierson 1994). This paper takes a different approach
by analyzing the regulatory politics of occupational pension retrenchment (cf. Trampusch
2006). The central argument advanced here is that the institutional structure of occupational
pensions (the regulatory framework and benefit design) shapes the responses of occupational
pension providers to financial market fluctuations, especially the distribution of gains and
losses from market performance. Several conclusions merit discussion.
First, there has been considerable retrenchment in occupational pension provision in
Switzerland and the Netherlands, but not in Denmark. These differences are not solely
attributable to the immaturity of the Danish system compared to the Swiss and Dutch
systems. Regulatory uncertainty about the ownership of surpluses in Switzerland and the
Netherlands in the 1990s created incentives for some pension plan sponsors (employers
in the Netherlands and life insurers in Switzerland) to pocket excess investment returns
rather than re-invest them. This option was simply not available in Denmark. Thus Danish
pension providers had larger financial reserves with which to respond to both the 2000-
2001 and 2008 downturns than Swiss and Dutch pension providers did.
Second, the process of adjustment in all three countries has been a fairly high visibility
process. To be sure, occupational pensions negotiated as part of collective wage agreements
have fewer direct spillovers into electoral politics than public pensions, but they are by no
means a matter of apolitical regulation. The issues at stake are different, many of the actors
are different, but the decision-making process is still marked by high levels of political
confict. This conclusion is at odds with Hacker’s claim that the politics of private social
policy is a low visibility, low conflict process. The Swiss parliament, for example, was
prompted into legislative action repeatedly in the 2000s in order to decrease the guaranteed
interest rate for Swiss occupational pensions. The stock market losses of Dutch pension
funds also led to legislative action by helping to speed up a reform process already under
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way: the reform of the regulatory framework for occupational pensions. This process was
marked by bitter conflict between the pensions regulator, social partners and the pension
funds.
Third, the analysis presented here supports the claim that the logic of change in private
social policy is different from that of public social policies because the institutional arena
is different (Hacker 2002; Anderson 2002). Whereas public pensions are negotiated in the
parliamentary and electoral arena, occupational pensions are negotiated in labour market
institutions. Rather than voters blaming politicians for pension losses, conflict is played
out in the pension fund boards administered by unions and employers, and between the
pension funds and the pensions regulator. The regulatory framework governing occupational
pensions structures this conflict because it determines which actors are empowered to
make decisions about the level of benefits and contributions; the rules concerning the
investment of pension assets; the definition of “full funding”; and the rules governing how
public and private pensions are integrated.
The ways in which policy-makers resolve the dilemmas associated with regulating
occupational pensions has important implications for the quality of pension provision and
the performance of the macroeconomy. As governments across Western European expand
occupational pensions as a way out of the public pensions “crisis”, these regulatory
dilemmas will grow in importance. The Dutch case especially, and to a lesser extent the
Swiss case, suggest that even the much-praised multipillar model is prone to predictable
weaknesses, and these weaknesses are directly linked to core features of Dutch and Swiss
occupational pension system. Multipillar systems can take many different forms, and the
specific Dutch and Swiss variants proved to be vulnerable to stock market swings. The
recent round of regulatory reform in the Netherlands appears to have largely addressed
these problems. However, the most far-reaching changes in the structure of Dutch
occupational pension provision, the massive switch from final salary to average earnings
benefit formulas and substantial increases in contributions, took place without much
public debate. This is a direct consequence of the regulatory framework, and the recent
reform of the PSW does not change this. In contrast, some aspects of the deteriorations in
the level of Swiss occupational pensions were publicly debated and decided in Parliament,
largely because there is a legislated guaranteed interest rate.
Danish occupational pensions seem to have weathered the stock market storm with little
damage. The structure of occupational provision in Denmark (facilitated by the regulatory
framework) provides a level of flexibility in responding to financial market turbulence that
the Dutch and Swiss systems did not offer. The modified DC construction of Danish
pensions means pension schemes build up a financial buffer that can be used to award
bonuses to members or to help weather financial turbulence. To put it another way, Danish
schemes make few promises about future benefits but their collective structure takes much
of the individual risk out of DC pensions. In contrast, the DB structure of Dutch pensions
and the incentives created by the regulatory framework were a recipe for pro-cyclical
effects. In an upswing, pension funds made higher profits and rewarded contributors with
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lower contributions, contributing to overheating of the economy. In a downturn, falling
financial returns sometimes forced drastic increases in contributions (see table 3 again)
and benefit deteriorations.
The analysis presented in this paper suggests two implications for further research
concerning occupational welfare. First, this paper has only touched on a few of the many
potential ways that the structure of occupational pension provision produces political
processes and outcomes distinct from those generated by public social policy programs.
Perhaps the most important feature of institutional design in the three countries analyzed
here is the collective nature of occupational provision. Hacker’s study of the United States
is probably the most thorough analysis to date of the political dynamics of “private
welfare” but the US is in many ways an exception (compared to Europe) because private
social policy is much less collectively organized than in Europe. The collective v.
individual nature of private provision will no doubt have consequences for the types of
political outcomes and processes associated with private social policy. Second, scholars
of the welfare state need to heed Hacker’s second major claim: public and private social
policies interact. This insight has deep intellectual roots, but the retrenchment literature
– largely because of its focus on electoral politics – has pushed mainly in the public
direction, to the neglect of private social policy. Given recent innovations in the study of
long-term processes of institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005, for example)
studying the interplay of public and private social policies should take on new theoretical
importance.
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Notes
1 Swiss occupational pensions are compulsory for all workers whereas collective bargaining
institutions in the Netherlands and Denmark ensure that occupational coverage is about 90 % in
both countries.
2 The term is Hacker’s (2002).
3 See the seminal work of Lowi (1964) and Wilson (1973).
4 Tax expenditures display features of both regulatory and distributive policy. Certainly tax breaks
for occupational pension provision have redistributive effects, but their chief purpose is to
encourage private actors to engage in specific behaviors, thus they are important elements in
regulatory policies.
5 See also Anderson (2007).
6 See Davis (1995) for a detailed discussion.
7 Autonomous pension funds are those which hold assets outside the firm. Non-autonomous pension
funds hold assets within the firm, usually as book reserves. The latter is common in Germany. See
Davis (n.d.) for a discussion of the technical issues.
8 In the EU, a series of life insurance directives apply.
9 There are two ways to underwrite pension benefits: the sponsor (employer) may do it or a pension
fund (separate from the employer) may do it. In the EU, pension funds (those not underwritten by
the employer) providing cover for biometric risks and/or that guarantee minimum investment
returns or benefits must hold additional assets to cover these promises. See the Occupational
Pension Fund Directive, Directive 2003/41 EC from 3 June 2003.
10 The Occupational Pension Fund Directive adopted by the EU in 2003 gives pension funds (IORPs,
Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision) the freedom to operate cross-border, something
that other financial institutions already could do. The directive includes regulations concerning
investment mix, financial oversight, and the minimum definition of full funding. Book reserve
schemes were excluded from the directive.
11 For example the requirement that pension assets be held outside the firm.
12 See Clark (2003) for an excellent discussion of pension regulation.
13 Obviously there are variations within each broad category.
14 In 1997 about 20 % of pension assets were managed by life insurance companies. See Queisser
and Vittas (2000: 9).
15 See the country chapters in Immergut, Anderson and Schulze, eds. (2007) for more detail.
16 The ATP is a public scheme introduced in 1964 that provides a flat rate benefit based on previous
hours worked rather than income. Only wage earners pay contributions; despite the small size of
this program, accumulated assets equ3al more than 19 % of GDP.
17 Union leaders’ reasoning seems to have been based on the fact that defined benefit schemes
require investment strategies geared toward steady and reliable income. In a collectively organized
defined contribution scheme, the absence of a specific pension promise means that investment
strategy is less constrained, and investment strategy need not be driven solely by the obligation
to generate steady income.
18 Company pension schemes fall under different regulations, but these are similar to those that
apply to life insurance companies.
19 Based on the example of a manual worker in the LO-DA wage agreements with a pension
contribution of 10.8 % of wages. The calculation takes taxes and benefits intro account as well as
lower commuting costs.
20 This surplus legally belongs to pension scheme members and must be distributed to them.
21 See Bonoli (2007) for more details.
22 All data is from www.bsv.admin.ch.
23 A notional account is a bookkeeping device used to calculate pension rights. Employers and
employees pay actual contributions into occupational pension schemes, but this stream of actual
contributions does not determine pension rights; notional contributions do. Swiss law determines
the minimum level of notional contributions; pension schemes are free to exceed these levels.
24 Bonoli and Häusermann (2008: 18, fn 10) report that in 1996 36 % of contributors were subject to
uniform contributions and 58 % to age-related contributions.
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25 The law requires age-related minimum credits to notional accounts (from 7-18 %, increasing with
age), but pension schemes have considerable flexibility in setting actual contributions. Schemes
may charge a uniform contribution, for example. See Bonoli (2007: 221).
26 The original conversion rate in 1985 was 7.2.
27 This section is based on Haverland (2003); van Riel et al. (2003) and Anderson (2007).
28 The legislation was passed in 2003.
29 As noted, only unions and employers are represented on pension fund boards, although nothing
prevents a retired worker from occupying one of the union slots. Pensioners had long pushed for
representation on the boards of the pension schemes, backed by D66, the Social Liberal Party.
The social partners agreed to increase pension representation on the boards, but there has been
little progress.
30 The ABP is one of the largest pension funds in the world with € 215 billion in assets in mid 2007
(www.abp.nl).
31 The switch is not retroactive. Pension rights accumulated under the old regime retain their value.
32 The solvency test and minimum funding test are part of the “Financial Assessment Framework”
(Financiële Toetsingkader, FTK) that is embedded in the new pension legislation.
33 The solvency test is a way of assessing whether pension funds can withstand financial shocks and
remain at 105 % coverage after one year of market movements. There should be more than 97.5 %
probability that a fund can meet all its obligations in one year (using a standard risk model).
34 The BVG Commission advises the government. The BVG is composed of representatives from
unions, employers and pension funds.
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Appendix
Table 1: Characteristics of Basic Pension Schemes in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark
* Reduced if non-pension income above DKK 252,400 (€33,889).
** Reduced if income more than DKK 55,700 (€7,478) ; no basic pension for those with
incomes over DKK 450,400 (€60,473).
 Gross 
benefit per 
month 
(2007) 
Pension in 
relation to 
average 
wages 
Basic 
pension 
financing 
(2007) 
Residence 
requirement 
Extent of 
funding 
Netherlands 
(Algemene 
ouderdomswet, 
AOW) 
• single:  
 €1,010 
• couple: 
 €1,384 
31% of 
average 
gross wages 
• employee  
 contributions  
 17.9% of 
 earnings  
 between  
 €13,160 and 
 €29,543 
• government  
 subsidy if  
 necessary 
50 years of 
residence 
between age 
15 and 65;  
2% benefit 
reduction for 
each missing 
year 
AOW savings 
fund 
€31 billion 
(end 2007) 
Switzerland 
(AHV/AVS) 
 
CHF 1105 
(€670) –  
CHF 2210 
(€1340) per 
month in  
2007 
 
20-40% of 
average 
gross wages 
• 4.2%  
 employer 
• 4.2%  
 employee 
• flat rate  
 contributions  
 for those not  
 employed 
• no ceiling 
• government  
 subsidy 20% 
contributions 
every year 
from age 21; 
proportional 
reduction for 
missing years 
reserve fund 
equal to one 
year of 
benefit 
payments 
Denmark 
(folkepension) 
• basic  
 amount:  
 DKK 4952*  
 (€664) 
• supplement: 
 DKK4985**  
 (€670) for  
 singles,  
 DKK 2328  
 (€312)  
 each for  
 couples 
35% of 
average 
gross wages 
general 
revenues 
40 years of 
residence 
between 15 
and 65 
none 
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